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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Bater v Bater1 Denning LJ stated that: 
 
“… in civil cases, the case may be proved by a preponderance of 
probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that 
standard”.2  
 
He added that a higher degree of probability would be required where 
a civil court was considering a charge of fraud than when considering 
whether negligence had been established. Even so, a court was not 
required to adopt “so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is 
considering a charge of a criminal nature”.3 In Hornal v Neuberger4 he 
again suggested that: 
 
“The more serious the allegation the higher the degree of 
probability that is required: but it need not, in a civil case, reach 
the very high standard required by the criminal law”.5  
 
Courts and tribunals in several jurisdictions have considered the 
proposition that an “intermediate” standard of proof or even the criminal 
standard of proof is applicable in a range of civil proceedings. These have 
involved, for example, cases concerning allegations of fraud,6 allegations 
                                                     

 Professor of Law, Buckingham Law School. 
1
 [1951] P 35.  
2
 Ibid 37. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 [1957] 1 QB 247. 
5
 Ibid 258. 
6
 In Addington v Texas (1979) 441 US 418, the Supreme Court of the United 
States recognised an intermediate standard in the form of “clear and convincing” 
evidence in civil cases involving allegations of fraud and other quasi-criminal 
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of professional misconduct,7 matrimonial issues,8 child protection 
proceedings,9 and contempt of court in civil proceedings.10  
This note explores the issue of the standard of proof in relation to 
presidential election petitions and reviews two recent decisions by the 
apex courts in Kenya and Ghana. These are of particular interest given the 
very different approach of the UK courts to election petitions (noted 
below) and epitomised in the case of Erlam and Others v Rahman and 
Others.11  
 
2. THE PRESIDENTIAL PETITION CASES 
 
Disputes as to whether a presidential or parliamentary election was 
“free and fair”12 can inevitably raise considerable tensions with the losing 
candidates often  alleging vote-rigging, corruption, bribery and other 
electoral malpractices by their opponents.13 Allegations of such 
                                                                                                                        
wrongdoing. Another example is found in the International Cricket Council‟s 
Anti-Corruption Code for Participants. This includes a series of corruption-
related offences and makes provision for a formal hearing of allegations by the 
ICC Anti-Corruption Tribunal against any person suspected of breaching the 
Code. Article 3.1 provides as follows: “... the burden of proof shall be on the ICC 
in all cases brought under the Anti-Corruption Code … and the standard of proof 
in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt”. 
7
 In Re A Solicitor [1993] QB 69 it was held that allegations of professional 
misconduct before a solicitors‟ disciplinary tribunal were to be proved to the 
criminal standard where an allegation amounted to a criminal offence. 
8
 Preston-Jones v Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391 but see now the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969, s 26. 
9
 In Re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 the House of Lords overruled earlier decisions 
and held that the standard of proof was the normal balance of probability in such 
cases.  
10
 Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch 128. 
11
 [2015] EWHC 1215 (QB). 
12
 A right enshrined in numerous international and regional instruments including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 25) and the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Chapter 7). See also 
Part I of the Charter of the Commonwealth. 
13
 See the discussion in John Hatchard, Peter Slinn & Muna Ndulo, Comparative 
Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and 
Southern African Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 62. 
Of course, some of the activities of the losing candidate(s) and their supporters 
may also involve similar practices.  
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malpractice involving the election of a directly elected president who is 
both head of state and head of government14 are of particular concern as 
they raise issues of the highest political, social and economic importance 
and sensitivity. Especially in small and/or ethnically divided states, the 
ensuing uncertainty and discontent can have far-reaching repercussions. 
This is epitomised by the violence in Kenya in 2007-8 which followed a 
disputed presidential election and which led to the deaths of over one 
thousand people and the displacement of over 600,000.
 15   
It is therefore essential to have in place a credible and transparent 
system to address allegations of electoral malpractice. Whilst electoral 
commissions often have general responsibility for the settlement of 
disputes prior to the election itself, the traditional approach in common 
law countries is for post-election challenges to be brought to the 
appropriate court by way of an election petition. 
Given that the allegations by the unsuccessful presidential 
candidate(s) often include charges of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct 
on the part of the respondent(s), a key issue in every case concerns the 
standard of proof to be applied by the court.  Here there is a divergence of 
opinion as to the appropriate standard and this is well-illustrated by the 
cases under review (known collectively as the “presidential petition” 
cases). Both have similar facts.  
First the Kenyan case. In Odinga v Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission and Others,16 (the Odinga case) following the 
presidential election in 2013 in Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the 
President-Elect. A successful presidential candidate required an overall 
majority of the valid votes cast. Mr Kenyatta received 50.7% of the votes 
cast.17 The unsuccessful challenger, Raila Odinga then lodged an election 
petition averring that “the electoral process was so fundamentally flawed 
that it precluded the possibility of discerning whether the presidential 
results declared were lawful”.18 Here the main complaint was that the 
                                                     
14
 As well as being Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 
15
 For a disturbing account of the post-election violence see generally the Final 
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, Nairobi 2013. 
16
 [2013] eKLR: available at  
http://www.kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=3777936669285
3178723650 (accessed 1 August 2015).  
17
 According to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Mr Uhuru 
Kenyetta received 50.7% of the votes cast whilst Mr Raila Odinga had received 
43.31%. 
18
 Odinga (n 16) [15].  
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election was not carried out in accordance with the electoral law with 
alleged defects in the Voters Register being the main cause for concern. 
In the Ghanaian case of Akufo-Addo v Mahama19 (the Mahama case), 
according to the Ghana Electoral Commission, in the 2012 presidential 
election of the almost 11 million votes cast, Mr John Mahama received 
50.7% whilst Mr Nana Akufo-Addo had received 47.74%. Article 63 of 
the Constitution of Ghana requires the successful presidential candidate to 
receive more than 50% of the valid votes cast. A loss of just 154,000 votes 
would have required a run-off between Mr Mahama and Mr Akufo-Addo. 
In his petition, Mr Akufo-Addo alleged that a series of electoral 
malpractices had affected the outcome of the election. Indeed Atuguba 
JSC in the Supreme Court of Ghana noted that “it is clear that the 
irregularities associated with the 2012 presidential election were 
substantial”.20   
As regards the burden of proof, the courts in both the Odinga and 
Mahama cases adopted the approach of the Uganda Supreme Court in the 
Besigye v Museveni,21 another presidential petition case.  Here it was held 
that the burden of proof in election petitions lies on the petitioner to prove 
not only that there had been non-compliance with the law but also that 
such failure affected the validity of the election itself.22 The court then 
added that the “… only controversy surrounds the standard of proof 
required to satisfy the Court”.   
 
3. WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN 
PRESIDENTIAL PETITION CASES? 
 
There are three markedly different approaches considered in the 
presidential petition cases. 
                                                     
19
 The case is seemingly unreported but a copy of the lengthy judgment is 
available at 
http://judicial.gov.gh/files/NANA_ADDO_DANKWA_AKUFO_ADDO__ORS_
_VRS__JOHN_DRAMANI_MAHAMA__ORS.pdf. (accessed 1 August 2015) 
All page references to the case in this note refer to this report. 
20
 99. 
21
 [2001] UGSC 3. This report is seemingly not readily available and for the 
purposes of this note, the judgment used is found at 
http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-law-election-petitions/2001/3 
(accessed 1 August 2015). Regrettably, this contains no page numbering nor 
numbered paragraphs. 
22
 See Odinga (n 16) [196] and Mahama 122.  
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Apply the Criminal Standard of Proof   
 
There is some jurisprudence to support the argument raised by the 
respondents in the Odinga case that given the seriousness of the 
allegations, a presidential election petition becomes a quasi-criminal 
matter which requires the court to impose the criminal standard of proof.
 23 
This reflects the view of the Supreme Court of India in Shri Kirpal Singh 
v Shri V V Giri24 that: 
 
“Although there are inherent differences between the trial of an 
election petition and that of a criminal charge in the matter of 
investigation, the vital point of identity for the two trials is that the 
court must be able to come to the conclusion beyond any 
reasonable doubt as to the commission of the corrupt practice”.  
 
Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Nwobodo v 
Onoh25 is one of a series of cases in which Nigerian courts have held that 
allegations of criminal activity in relation to election petitions must be 
proved to the criminal standard.26 This view was supported by Anin 
Yeboah JSC in the Mahama case who asserted that “It is only when crime 
is pleaded or raised in evidence that the allegation sought to be proved 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt”.27 
This approach also reflects the position in the United Kingdom. Thus 
in the Erlam case,
28
 the petitioners petitioned to have a local election in 
the London Borough of Tower Hamlets set aside on several grounds, 
principally alleging that the respondent or his agents had indulged in 
corrupt and illegal practices contrary to the Representation of the People 
Act 1983. In his judgment, Commissioner Mawrey QC recognised that an 
election court is a civil court and not a criminal court.29  However, 
                                                     
23
 [181]. For an interesting argument that the criminal standard of proof should be 
applied to all civil cases involving allegations of criminal conduct see Ennis 
McBride, „Is the Civil “Higher Standard of Proof” a Coherent Concept?‟ (2009) 
8(4) Law, Probability and Risk 323. 
24
 1971(2) SCR 197; 1970(2) SCC 567. 
25
 [1984] 1 SC 1; (1983) 14 NSCC 470. 
26
 See also Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1 and Agagu v Mimiko 
[2009] All FWLR (Pt. 462) 1122. 
27
 460. 
28
 Erlam and Others v Rahman and Others (n 11) 
29
 [45]. 
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following the Court of Appeal decision in R v Rowe ex p. Mainwaring30 he 
noted that: 
“There was no controversy at the hearing about the standard of proof 
the court must apply to charges of corrupt and illegal practices. It is settled 
law that the court must apply the criminal standard of proof, namely proof 
beyond reasonable doubt”.31 
 
Require the petitioner to establish the case on a balance of probabilities  
 
In the well-known case of Jugnauth v Ringadoo and Others,32 the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Mauritius, nullifying the election of the appellant, a 
Member of Parliament and Minister of the Government. Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry, giving the judgment of the Board emphasised that “there is no 
question of the court applying any kind of intermediate standard” and 
accordingly:  
 
“It follows that the issue for the election court was whether the 
petitioner had established, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
election was affected by bribery in the manner specified in the 
petition.”33  
 
This view is reflected in the Mahama case where the majority of the 
judges of the Supreme Court adopted the approach of Atuguba JSC who 
was content to apply section 12 of the Evidence Act 1975 which provided 
that the standard of proof is by a “preponderance of probabilities”.34 In 
doing so, he emphasised that “The standard of proof in especially election 
petitions, a species of a civil case, is on the balance of probabilities or 
preponderance of probabilities”.35  
 
                                                     
30
 [1992] 1 WLR 1059. 
31
 [47]. 
32
 [2008] UKPC 50. 
33
 [17] and [19]. 
34
 Section 12(2) reads: „“Preponderance of probabilities” means that degree of 
certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which it is 
convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence‟. 
35
 At 62. A similar view was taken by Owusu JSC (199 et seq), Dotse JSC (316), 
Baffoe-Bonnie JSC (517) and Akoto-Bamfo JSC (570). 
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Apply an Intermediate Standard   
 
Two earlier decisions from Commonwealth African courts had 
supported this approach. In Lewanika and Others v Chiluba36 the 
petitioners had alleged that there was bribery, fraud and other electoral 
irregularities in a presidential election in Zambia and sought its 
nullification. Ngulube, CJ, giving the judgment of the court, stated: 
 
“… we wish to assert that it cannot be seriously disputed that 
parliamentary election petitions have generally long required to be 
proved to a standard higher that on a mere balance of probability.” 
 
No authority was cited for this statement but it formed the basis of the 
holding that:  
 
“… where the petition has been brought under constitutional 
provisions and would impact upon the governance of the nation 
and the deployment of the constitutional power and authority, no 
less a standard of proof is required. It follows also the issues raised 
are required to be established to a fairly high degree of convincing 
clarity”.37 
 
Similarly, in Besigye v Museveni
38
 the unsuccessful presidential 
candidate had alleged that the respondents were responsible for a series of 
offences and other illegal electoral practices. Odoki CJ having referred to 
the decision of Denning LJ in Bater v Bater
39
 with approval, asserted that 
in election petitions the “standard of proof is very high because the subject 
matter of the petition is of critical importance to the welfare of the people 
of Uganda and their democratic governance”.40 
The Supreme Court of Kenya in the Odinga case, considered these 
cases and also adopted the “higher standard of proof” approach holding 
that:   
 
 
                                                     
36
 [1999] 1 LRC 138. 
37
 No page numbers are provided in the electronic version of the relevant law 
report. 
38
 Besigye (n 21). 
39
 N 1.  
40
 84. 
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“The threshold of proof should, in principle, be above the balance 
of probability, though not as high as beyond reasonable doubt: 
save that this would not affect the normal standards where 
criminal charges linked to an election, are in question”.41  
 
Similarly, in the Mahama case, Adinyira JSC noted the need for “high 
standards of proof” in cases imputing election malpractice and concluded, 
without further consideration, that the “threshold of proof should, in 
principle, be above the balance of probability”.42  
 
4. WHICH STANDARD OF PROOF TO APPLY? 
 
Applying the criminal standard raises significant issues. As Omotola 
has pointed out, there are already numerous obstacles facing those seeking 
to bring an electoral petition and “the huge cost of seeking electoral 
justice, the undue protraction of litigation, and the seeming lack of 
independence of the judiciary, have served to limit the reach of electoral 
justice”.43 In the Erlam case, Commissioner Mawrey QC noted the 
“enormous courage” required by a private citizen to bring an election 
petition and that “If things go wrong and the Petition is dismissed, the 
Petitioners face a potentially devastating bill of costs which … may well 
bankrupt them”.44   
Thus placing on petitioners an additional hurdle of satisfying the 
criminal standard of proof is surely unacceptable. Even where there are 
allegations of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct made against the 
respondents, an election petition is fundamentally different to a criminal 
case and it follows that the courts in the presidential petition cases rightly 
recognised this point.45  
The view contrasts starkly with that of the Court of Appeal in R v 
Rowe.
46
 Here the Court of Appeal was considering an appeal from the 
                                                     
41
 [203]. Emphasis in the original. 
42
 122-123. 
43
 Shola Omotola „Explaining electoral violence in Africa‟s “new” democracies‟ 
at page 52: available at 
www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/download/63320/51203 (accessed 1 August 
2015). 
44
 Erlam and Others v Rahman and Others (n 11) [643] and [644]. 
45
 In Besigye v Museveni (n 21), the Supreme Court also rejected earlier Ugandan 
decisions imposing the criminal standard. 
46
 N 30. 
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Divisional Court concerning the judicial review of an election petition 
involving section 115 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
Subsection (1) provides that “A person shall be guilty of a corrupt practice 
if he is guilty of undue influence”.  Whilst Farquharson LJ noted that the 
issue was not significant in the case itself, he asserted that in addressing 
the standard of proof in relation to such cases:  
 
“… a person accused of corrupt practice before an electoral court 
should only be held to have committed it if the allegation is 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The subsection refers to a person 
being “guilty” of corrupt practice, and that connotes a criminal 
offence. It would not be desirable to have a different standard of 
proof in different courts on the same issue”.47   
 
It is precisely because an election court is widely (and arguably 
correctly) viewed as being a civil court, that the imposition of a lower 
standard of proof is justified. Whilst a person found to have been involved 
in electoral malpractice may face serious consequences, including being 
disqualified from participation in future elections, an election court does 
not impose criminal penalties. This is a matter for a criminal court which 
is very different animal, especially given the application of the right to a 
fair trial provisions and the restrictive rules as to the admissibility of 
evidence.   
As regards the application of an intermediate standard, there are 
several inter-related arguments to support its adoption. Firstly, given their 
subject matter, presidential petition cases are “peculiar civil proceedings” 
meriting special treatment.48 Thus as Ngulube CJ asserted in Lewanika v 
Chiluba, given that the outcome of such a case would “impact upon the 
governance of the nation and the deployment of the constitutional power 
and authority”, imposing a high evidential hurdle on petitioners would 
“deter unmeritorious petitions designed to destabilise the new 
government”.49  Secondly, it is argued that judges must avoid the 
“political question” for the national Constitution has entrusted the people 
with the task of electing their President. This is highlighted by the holding 
of Supreme Court of Kenya in the Odinga case that: “As a basic principle, 
it should not be for the Court to determine who comes to occupy the 
                                                     
47
 Ibid 1068.  
48
 See the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Nwobodo v Onoh (n 48). 
49
 Ngulube CJ in Lewanika (n 36).  
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Presidential office”.50 Similarly, Atuguba JSC in the Mahama case 
asserted that: 
 
“… for starters I would state that the Judiciary in Ghana, like its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions, does not readily invalidate a 
public election but often strives in the public interest, to sustain 
it”.51  
 
In analysing such decisions, it is important to place them against the 
background of the significant pressures inevitably placed on judges 
dealing with presidential petitions, especially for those serving in small, 
ethnically divided and/or politically volatile countries. Thus imposing a 
high standard of proof on petitioners can be seen as a way of ensuring that 
the most sensitive of “political questions” is avoided as well as any 
“counter-majoritarianism” arguments whilst offering judges some 
protection from undue political pressure or concerns as to their 
independence. 
The arguments against an intermediate standard focus both on practice 
and policy. As regards the former, the question of what constitutes the 
appropriate “intermediate standard” is not explored in any of the cases. 
Instead various phrases are suggested including a “fairly high degree of 
convincing clarity”, “above the balance of probability”, and a “very high 
standard of proof”. Such opaqueness concerning this so-called “high 
evidential hurdle” is liable to seriously impact on those with a meritorious 
case and reinforces the argument that the standard of proof is merely 
being used as a convenient mechanism to prevent/deter challenges to 
presidential elections.  
As regards policy, it is a fundamental constitutional right for the 
people to choose their own President in free and fair elections. It is trite 
that maintaining a level playing field throughout the electoral process 
serves to reinforce the constitutional imperative of holding demonstrably 
free and fair presidential elections in order to establish and maintain 
political stability and public confidence in the electoral process. As the 
                                                     
50
 At [299]. See also the comment by Smith Etieno „The Political Question 
Doctrine: A Look at Petition No 5 of 2013 available at 
http://www.academia.edu/6730672/The_Political_Question_Doctrine_A_Look_at
_Petiton_No._5_of_2013_Raila_Odinga_and_2_others_v_I.E.B.C_and_3_Others 
(accessed 1 August 2015). 
51
 99. 
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Supreme Court of Kenya itself noted in the Odinga case, the Constitution 
of Kenya places on the judiciary the obligation to: 
 
“safeguard the electoral process and ensure that individuals 
accede to power in the Presidential office, only in compliance with 
the law regarding elections”.52  
 
It follows that presidential petitions are not “peculiar civil 
proceedings” as asserted in Nwobodo v Onoh53 meriting special treatment 
but are civil cases raising fundamental constitutional issues. Such issues 
do not require a higher standard of proof than that required in other civil 
matters. Indeed it is because fundamental constitutional rights are 
involved that the application of the normal civil standard is necessary. 
Accordingly the courts cannot abrogate their constitutional mandate nor 
seek to circumvent it by requiring a higher standard of proof. This is 
rightly supported by the majority of the judges in the Mahama case.  
 
5. OVERVIEW 
 
The confusion over the standard of proof in presidential petition cases 
is unnecessary and unacceptable. Whilst some might agree with the view 
of Denning LJ in Bater v Bater, albeit in very different circumstances, 
that: “The difference of opinion which has been evoked about the standard 
of proof … may well turn out to be more a matter of words than anything 
else”,54 the issue is far too serious to adopt this approach. There is 
therefore no basis for applying anything other than the civil standard of 
proof.55 However as Lord Rodger of Earlsferry noted in Jugnauth v 
Ringadoo,
56
 in an election petition case “as a matter of common sense 
rather than law” a Court was unlikely to be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities that there has been bribery without cogent evidence to that 
effect.57 This point is reflected in the words of Lord Nicholls of 
                                                     
52 
Odinga (n 16) [299]. Italics in the original. 
53
 N 25. 
54
 Ibid 36: a point noted by Odoki CJ in Besigye v Museveni (n 21) 8. 
55
 It is argued that this principle also applies to the UK position and that the 
decision in R v Rowe needs reviewing. 
56
 N 32 
57
 [19].  
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Birkenhead who explained in In re H (Minors)(Sexual Abuse: Standard of 
Proof)58 that: 
 
“… some things are inherently more likely than others… On this 
basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil 
tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some 
other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether 
the tribunal thinks it more probable than not”.59  
 
Whilst bound by the earlier Court of Appeal decision in R v Rowe, it is 
unfortunate that the court in Erlam v Rahman did not take the opportunity 
to at least note this decision, perhaps with a view to having it applied in 
later election petition cases in the United Kingdom.  Certainly, courts 
when faced with presidential election petitions should be encouraged to 
adopt this approach. 
In the event, the petitioners in both presidential petition cases were 
unsuccessful.60 However, disagreement over the fundamental issue as to 
the appropriate standard of proof to apply in such cases can only bring 
confusion and a sense of grievance on the part of petitioners and their 
supporters.  
Overall, perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the presidential 
petition cases is that the disputes were fought out in the courts and not in 
the streets. Further that the decisions of each court were respected by the 
unsuccessful petitioners. Accordingly the cases rightly “represent a 
necessary non-violent, constitutional move, worthy of commendation, to 
correct and secure the integrity of elections, hence, the future of 
democracy, peace, stability and development in Africa”.61  
                                                     
58
 [1996] AC 563. 
59
 Ibid 586. These words are in stark contrast to the view of the Court of Appeal 
in R v Rowe. 
60
 In the Mahama case the Supreme Court of Ghana rejected the petition by a 5-4 
majority with all the judges recognising that there had been irregularities in the 
electoral process. However, in the view of the majority, the number of votes 
affected was not so significant as to make any impact on the result even if they 
were annulled. 
61
 A phrase drawn from the Danquah Institute Report on the Presidential Election 
Petition in Ghana 2013, 1: available at 
http://www.danquahinstitute.org/news/1807-report-on-the-presidential-election-
petition-in-ghana-23-february-2013-updated-18-march.html (accessed 1 August 
2015). 
